A secure and efficient cryptosystem can be constructed through three primary methods, the discrete logarithm system (e.g. DSA), the integer factorization system (e.g. RSA), and the elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) [1] [2]. This paper employs the elliptic curve cryptosystem method. The elliptic curve cryptosystem has low computational amount and short key size, both of which benefit a cryptosystem in limited-hardware environment with reduced overheads. The ECC provides a suitable environment for the cryptosystems.
Introduction
The elliptic curve theory was proposed in 1985 by Koblitz [1] and Miller [2] . The theory has since then been widely applied to various cryptosystems. The ECC equips cryptosystems with tight security through its difficult to solve elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) [2, 3 and 4] . Unlike the integer factorization algorithm and the discrete logarithm problem, the ECDLP is extremely difficult and time consuming to solve. There exists no efficient solution to this problem. Moreover, The ECC consumes a much smaller bit size yet provides a security equal to that provided by the RSA or DSA.
The elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) was applied to improve the undeniable signature scheme by Lin and Wu [5, 6] . Lin [7] later employed the ECC on the undeniable signature scheme by Chaum [8] to produce an elliptic-curve undeniable signature scheme. The ECC is also applied to the group-oriented undeniable signature scheme by Harn and Yang [9] . This paper proposes to improve the above schemes through upgrading. This paper is divided into five sections. Section one introduces the proposal; section two introduces the elliptic curve cryptosystem; the proposal is detailed in section three; section four analyzes the security and efficiency of the proposed scheme; section five draws conclusions.
An Introduction to the Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem
The general equation for the elliptic curve is , p b ax x y mod 3 2 + + = p is a natural prime number, and the value of should satisfy the discriminate . Only then could , be used as the decrypting elliptic curve [10] . Before we introduce the addition operation of the elliptic curve [4] , we need to first introduce a special point O, known as the point of infinity and it satisfies the following properties:
(1) If P, Q are two points on the elliptic curve, O is the point of infinity, then P＋O＝O+P=P. 
If there is a point G on the elliptic curve, and this point is the base point, then the operation on nG has the following properties, 1G=G, 2G=G＋G, 3G=G＋G＋G=2G ＋G, ..., (n-1)G=G＋G+ ...＋G with a total of (n-1) G, nG=O, (n＋1)G=G. Thus the nG is n×G formal, meaning addition operations of the elliptic curve, and not the general multiplication operation, are continuously performed on n number of G's. , hence it is proved that the points on the elliptic curve are (2, 4), (2, 7), (3, 5) , (3, 6) , (5, 2), (5, 9), (7, 2), (7, 9) , (8, 3) , (8, 8) , (10, 2) , (10, 9) . If A, B both chose the point (2, 7) as G (Generator point), and performs the addition operation of the elliptic curve, then G=(2, 7), 2G=G＋G=(5, 2), 3G=2G＋G=(8, 3), 4G=(10, 2), 5G=(3, 6), 6G=(7, 9), 7G=(7, 2), 8G=(3, 5), 9G=(10, 9), 10G= (8, 8) , 11G=(5, 9), 12G=(2, 4), 13G=O, 14G=(2, 7). 
The Proposed Scheme
Suppose that there are k ≥ 2 users in a group, and every user of the group has a private key. The users are represented in the sequence of U 1 , U 2 , U 3 ,…, U k , and the proposed scheme is based on the same condition.
Key Generation Phase
In order to sign a message M∈ [1, n-1] , each user in the group generates his/her private key; using the private keys of all the users of the same group, the group public key is calculated as follows:
Step 1: Select an elliptic curve E defined over Z p . For security reasons, E should be divisible by a large prime number.
Step 2: Select a base point G∈E(Z p ) whose order must be a large prime number, defined as n.
Step 3: Each user in the group selects a random integer d i ∈[1, n-1] as his/her private key, in which i = 1, 2, 3, …, k.
Step 4: Let Q 1 = d 1 ×G, then the group public key Q can be calculated as follows through the cooperation of all users.
Commitment Phase
Let Z 1 = (d 1 M mod n)×Q, then the group undeniable signature Z can be calculated as follows through the cooperation of all users.
Afterwards, Z and M is sent to Bob for verification.
Verification Phase
Step 1: Bob selects two random integers a and b∈ [1, n-1] and computes
, then sends W to Alice.
Step 2: After receiving W, let R 1 = (d 1 -1 mod n)×W, then R can be calculated as follows through the cooperation of all users.
Step 3: According to R, Bob calculates
R' = (aM mod n)×Q + b×G
If R' = R, then the group undeniable signature Z and the message M is authentic.
Theorem 1.
In the verification phase, if R' = R, the undeniable signature Z and the message M is authenticated.
Proof: For brevity, let t = d 1 
Performance an Analysis and Security Issue

Performance analysis
An analysis of the performance of the proposed scheme is presented in the subsection below. The symbols are defined as follows:
: time required by modulus operation;
T INV : time required by modulus inverse element operation;
T ADD : time required by the modular addition operation;
T EC_MUL : time required by elliptic curve multiplication operation;
kG is given in reference [10] , where k is a random 160-bit integer and G∈E(Z p ). E is an elliptic curve defined over Z p and p ≈ 2
160
. The time complexity clearly presented in the following relationship:
Modulus addition and subtraction operation amount is negligible and thus omitted. Table 1 lists the algorithm and time complexity phase by phase for easier understanding of the efficiency of the proposed scheme. Table 1 also clearly illustrates significant improvement in system performance in terms of time complexity in the proposed scheme.
Security Issue
The solution to the ECDLP is based on the derivation of d in relation to the given G and Q as follows:
is operated under the elliptic curve cryptosystem. Q is the point derived from d×G and the variance of Q depends on the value of d. Therefore an attacker, due to his inability to solve the ECDLP, shall fail to derive the private key and hence unable to forge signatures. 
Conclusions
The discrete logarithm system was induced into the elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) in Lin's scheme. This induction served to improve the ECC. The proposed scheme served to improve efficiency and security of Lin's scheme.
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